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Migration flows are shaped by a complex combination of self-selection and out-selection 
mechanisms. In this paper, we analyze how existing diasporas (the stock of people born in a 
country and living in an another one) affect the size and human-capital structure of current 
migration flows. Our analysis exploits a bilateral data set on international migration by 
educational attainment from 195 countries to 30 OECD countries in 1990 and 2000. Based on 
simple micro-foundations and controlling for various determinants of migration, we find 
diasporas increase migration flows, lower their average educational level and lead to higher 
concentration of low-skill migrants. Interestingly, diasporas explain majority of the variability 
of migration flows and selection. This suggests that, without changing the generosity of 
family reunion programs, education-based selection rules are likely to have moderate impact. 
Our results are highly robust to the econometric techniques, accounting for the large 
proportion of zeros and endogeneity problems. 
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behind. I believed I would return eight years later, probably marry an
Igbo girl, and then spend the rest of my life in Nigeria But 25 years ago,
I fell in love with an American girl, married her three years later, and
became eligible to sponsor a Green Card visa for my 35 closest relatives,
including my parents and all my siblings, nieces and nephews. The story
of how I brought 35 people to the United States exempli￿es how 10 million
skilled people have emigrated out of Africa during the past 30 years. We
came to the United States on student visas and then changed our status
to become permanent residents and then naturalized citizens Our new
citizenship status helped us sponsor relatives, and also inspired our friends
to immigrate here." (Philip Emeagwali)1
1 Introduction
Diasporas constitute invisible nations that reside outside their origin countries. In
2000, there were over 6 million Mexicans working in the United States, more than 1.2
million Turks in Germany and more than 0.5 million Algerians in France. In relative
terms, 45 percent of the Surinamese-born were in the Netherlands; about 35 percent of
the native-born from Grenada were in the United States; over 25 percent of Samoans
were in New Zealand. Despite some of these staggering numbers, migrant diasporas
exhibit diverse patterns, especially in terms of their human capital and education
levels. Only 6.5 percent of the 22,000 Angolans in Portugal have post-secondary
education whereas this proportion rises to 80 percent among the 715 Angolans in
Canada. In total, 90 percent of all Angolan migrants with post-secondary education
live in just ￿ve destination countries in the OECD.
This paper explores the role of existing diasporas on the size, educational structure
and concentration of migration ￿ ows across di⁄erent destinations. Understanding
the role of migrant diasporas, especially how that role interacts with governments￿
migration policies is a critical issue for both sending and receiving countries. In
addition to the welfare of its citizens living under other countries￿jurisdiction, sending
countries￿governments are concerned about the costs and bene￿ts of migration on the
residents who stay at home. For the receiving countries, migrants generate signi￿cant
externalities on the natives through capital and labor markets and as well public
1Extract of the keynote speech by Philip Emeagwali at the Pan African Conference on Brain
Drain, Elsah, Illinois on October 24, 2003. Philip Emeagwali won the 1989 Gordon Bell Prize, which
has been called "supercomputing￿ s Nobel Prize", for inventing a formula that allows computers to
perform their fastest computations - a discovery that inspired the reinvention of supercomputers.
He was extolled by then U.S. President Bill Clinton as "one of the great minds of the Information
Age" and described by CNN as "a Father of the Internet". He is the most searched-for scientist on
the Internet.
2￿nance channels (see Borjas, 1994, 1995, 1999, Razin and Sadka, 2004, Friedberg
and Hunt, 1995, among others). In short, regardless of question at hand, diasporas
in￿ uence the welfare of all parties concerned - families back at home in the origin
country, potential migrants searching for better opportunities and the natives in the
destination country.
A large literature in sociology and economics has identi￿ed that migrants￿net-
works facilitate further migration of people, movement of goods, capital, and ideas
across national borders (see Rauch and Casella, 1998, Rauch and Trindade, 2002,
Munshi, 2003, Rauch, 2003, Gao, 2003, Rapoport and Kugler, 2006, Docquier and
Lodigiani, 2008). As it is presented repeatedly in the literature, the structure and
the size of migration ￿ ows arise from a complex mix of self-selection factors (wage
di⁄erentials, probability to ￿nd a job, welfare programs and amenities, migration
costs, etc.) and out-selection factors (immigration policies at destination, mobility
agreements, etc.). Our contribution is to show the role played by existing diasporas
in shaping various characteristics of these ￿ ows.
Several studies focused on the self-selection mechanism, generally disregarding
network externalities. Extending Roy￿ s model (see Roy, 1951), Borjas (1987) demon-
strate that migrants from poor countries with high returns to skills tend to be neg-
atively selected, thus explaining how changes in the origin mix of US immigrants
(from EU countries to Latin American and Asian countries) over time has a⁄ected
their average skills and performance in the US labor market. Assuming that migra-
tion costs decrease with educational attainment, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) develop
a model compatible with positive, negative and intermediate selections, depending
on the range of the schooling distribution. They ￿nd that Mexican emigrants, while
much less educated than U.S. natives, are on average more educated than residents
of Mexico and tend to occupy the middle and upper portions of Mexico￿ s wage dis-
tribution. In terms of observable skills, there is intermediate or positive selection of
immigrants from Mexico.
Existing migrant networks play an important role on the migration decisions of
potential migrants. Relying on the informational and ￿nancial support provided by
the network, newcomers can lower their migration and assimilation costs. As dis-
cussed in Massey et al. (1993), models of migrant diasporas are based on the theory
of ￿ network externalities￿ . In particular, Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath
(1996) show that when moving costs decrease with the size of the network already
settled in the destination (an assumption which is supported by many sociological
studies), migration occurs gradually over time. Migration tends to follow geographi-
cal, cultural or political channels and low-moving-cost individuals migrate ￿rst. Their
presence lowers the migration costs of the next group and the process continues as
long as bene￿ts exceed costs of migration2. In addition to these cost-based network
externalities, diasporas attract new migrants via family reuni￿cation programs if the
2Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008) also ￿nd evidence of strong network e⁄ects in immigration
￿ ows into 27 OECD countries during the period 1990-2000
3destination country government has implemented them. In most continental Euro-
pean countries, family reuni￿cation is the main route for many potential migrants.
Even in one of the most selective country such as Canada, about 40 percent of immi-
grants come under the family reuni￿cation and refugee programs, rather than selec-
tive employment or skill-based programs. Emegwali￿ s quotation perfectly illustrates
these channels. Through network e⁄ects (￿our presence [...] inspired our friends to
immigrate here￿ ) and family reuni￿cation programs (￿I became eligible to sponsor
35 relatives for a Green Card￿ ), existing diasporas positively impact future ￿ ows of
migrants.
Only a few papers analyze the linkages between diasporas and the structure of
migration ￿ ows. Building on Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Mc Kenzie and Rapoport
(2007) start from the intermediate selection case (which re￿ ects the Mexico-to-US
pattern) and demonstrate that a decrease in migration costs generally has a stronger
e⁄ect on low-skill migration than on high-skilled migration.3 Using survey data from
Mexico, they show that the probability of migration increases with education in com-
munities with low migrant networks, but decreasing with education in communities
with high migrant networks. Taking advantage of a recent data set on international
migration by educational attainment (see Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk, 2009), our
paper generalizes this result by analyzing the role of diaspora size on the educational
structure of migration from 195 countries to the 30 OECD countries. Accounting for
the usual determinants of migration and correcting for several econometric problems,
we show that larger diasporas increase migration ￿ ows and lower their average edu-
cational level, as expected. To reinforce this result, we analyze the e⁄ect of diasporas
on the geographic concentration of high-skill and low-skill migrants. We show that
diasporas increase the concentration of low-skill migrants relative to high-skilled ones.
Interestingly, diasporas explain a large portion of the variability of migrants￿￿ ows
(71 percent) and selection (47 percent). These percentages capture both network ex-
ternalities that lower migration costs and the e⁄ect of family reuni￿cation programs.
Thus, without changing the generosity of these family reunion programs, education-
based migrant selection rules are likely to have a moderate impact,especially in coun-
tries hosting large diasporas. These results are highly robust to various econometric
techniques, accounting for the large proportion of zeros and possible correlation of
the network size with unobservable components of the migration ￿ ows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 describes migration
data and presents some stylized facts on the size and structure of diaspora and mi-
gration ￿ ows. Section 3 derives testable predictions from a stylized theoretical model.
Econometric issues are discussed and empirical results are presented in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
3Bertolini (2009) provides also similar evidence from the Ecuadorian migration to Spain and the
US. The negative selection of Ecuadorian migrants to the US is largely explained by the size of the
networks at destination.
42 Stylized facts
The term diaspora (in ancient Greek, "a scattering or sowing of seeds") refers to
dispersion of any people or ethnic population, voluntarily or by force, from their tra-
ditional homelands and the ensuing developments in their culture in the destination,
mostly as a minority. In the economic sense, the diaspora refers to migrants who
gather in relatively signi￿cant numbers in a particular destination country or region.
Some examples are the Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany, South Asian workers in the
Persian Gulf and Cuban migrants in the US.
Following this de￿nition, we consider the size of a diaspora as the population
(aged 25+) born in country i and living in country j. We use the Docquier, Lowell
and Marfouk (2007, referred to as DLM from now on) database which extends and
updates Docquier and Marfouk (2006). Based on census and register information on
the structure of migrant communities in all OECD countries in 1990 and 2000, DLM
database provides the stock of immigrants from any given country in each of the
OECD countries by education level. The dataset covers only the adult population
aged 25 and over, thus excludes children and students who emigrate temporarily to
complete their education. In addition, migration is de￿ned on the basis of the country
of birth rather than citizenship4.
The main strength of the DLM database is that it distinguishes between three
levels of education for migrants. High-skilled migrants are those with post-secondary
education. Medium-skilled migrants are those with upper-secondary education com-
pleted. Low-skilled migrants are those with less than upper-secondary education,
including those with lower-secondary and primary education or those who did not go
to school. The main characteristics of the diaspora that we consider in this paper are
the following:
￿ the size of the diaspora, measured as the population aged 25+ born in country
i and living in the OECD country j (6= i).
￿ the education level of the diaspora, proxied by the log-ratio of the proportions
of high-skill to low-skill migrants.
￿ the concentration of the diaspora, measured as the Her￿ndhal index applied to
the distribution of the diaspora across di⁄erent destinations.
Table 1 shows the 20 largest bilateral migrant communities residing in the OECD
countries, both by overall size and by di⁄erent education levels. The distinction
4Even though this is the standard de￿nition of a migrant, especially in the economics literature,
the dataset does not include second generation children who are born in the destination country even
though they might constitute an important part of a diaspora in the sociological sense. This is simply
due to absence of comprehensive administrative data in tracking of the migrants￿children. However,
we expect diaspora sizes inclusive and exclusive of second generation to be highly correlated.
5between skilled and unskilled diasporas and its consequences is one of the most im-
portant contributions of this paper. With respect to the size, Table 1 allows to observe
directly some of the determinants of the size of the diaspora, especially at a given
destination country. As clearly seen in Table 1, the sizes of sending and receiving
countries￿populations are primary determinants of the size of the diasporas. That is
why the United States appears as the home to many of the largest migrant commu-
nities and larger developing countries (such as Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines and
India) are the main sending countries. Other factors, such as wage di⁄erentials, phys-
ical distance, linguistic proximity, colonial links, immigration policies at destination,
are also frequently identi￿ed in the empirical literature as determinants of migration
and clearly in￿ uence the migration corridors listed in Table 1.
In order to shed some preliminary light on how existing networks a⁄ect migration
￿ ows and and especially their human capital (educational) composition, let us look
at the size and the educational structure of the Turkish diaspora in three di⁄erent
European countries: Germany, Spain and Luxembourg. Turkey is an interesting case
since it does not have any colonial links, has no linguistic proximity with any of the
major destination countries5 but has large diasporas in a limited number of countries
like Germany (see Table 1). The geodesic distance between Turkey and the three
considered European countries is broadly the same and wage levels at destination
are not very di⁄erent across destination countries (they are higher in Luxembourg
and lower in Spain). The data on the size of diaspora and the educational structure
of those diasporas display striking di⁄erences. In 2000, there were only 194 Turkish
migrants in Luxembourg, with 44% (26%) with a tertiary (primary) education level.
In Germany, the corresponding ￿gures are 1.2 million Turkish migrants with 6%
(86%) with a tertiary (primary) educational level. In Spain, there were 1040 Turkish
migrants, with 33% (29%) with a tertiary (primary) educational level. This simple
example highlights the striking relationship between migrants￿networks and both the
size and the skill composition of migration ￿ ows.
What is the extent of the relationship between diasporas and migration ￿ ows and
how general is it in the data? Figure 1 provides another perspective and depicts
the size of bilateral diasporas and the proportion of post-secondary educated (high-
skilled) from four origin countries: Mexico, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania. The curves
are the exponential trends estimated for all origin countries and show that there is
negative relationship between the diaspora size and the level of education. This
￿gure shows the importance of analyzing bilateral data with econometric models
that account for origin and destination country speci￿c e⁄ects.
The next question is on the concentration/dispersion of migrants across di⁄erent
destinations. Figure 2 compares the concentration index (measured by the Her￿nd-
hal￿ s index) of high-skill and low-skill migrants and indicates that there is a positive
relationship between the two. In other words, for many source countries, both the
5Turkish is an Ural-Altaic language. The only European languages that are grammatically close
are Finnish and Hungarian but they have almost no common vocabulary.
6high and low skilled migrants tend to be either concentrated in few destination coun-
tries or relatively dispersed across the globe. A closer look also reveals that a larger
share of the observations lie below the 45-degree line on the right side of the ￿gure
indicating low-skill migrants are even more concentrated than high-skilled migrants
if the overall migration is concentrated. On the other hand, more observations on
the left side of the ￿gure are above the 45-degree line implying high-skill migrants
are more concentrated if the overall concentration level is low. Another contribution
of the paper is to empirically identify the determinants of the relative concentration




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Figure 1. Percentage of highly skilled (Y-Axis) and Log size (X-axis) of
diasporas for selected countries
Figure 2. Concentration of the high-skilled (Y-axis) and low-skilled
(X-axis) diasporas
93 Theoretical foundations
We consider model of migration with a single skill type in order to model the e⁄ects
of diasporas. A worker endowed with h units of human capital earns a wage wih
in country i where wi is the skill price in that country. As in Rosenzweig (2008),
this structure re￿ ects the assumptions that (i) the main source of variation in wages
within a country is the di⁄erences in the human capital levels (h) of the residents and
(ii) the source of variation in wages across countries is the di⁄erences in average skill
levels and skill prices (wi). The individual utility is linear in income but also depends
on possible moving costs and characteristics of the country of residence. The utility
of a type-h individual born in country i and staying in country i is given by:
uii(h) = wih + Ai + "i
where Ai denotes country i￿ s characteristics (amenities, public expenditures, climate,
etc.) and "i is a iid extreme-value distributed random term. The utility obtained
when the same person migrates to country j is given by
uij(h) = wjh + Aj ￿ Cij(:) ￿ Vij(:) + "j
The migration costs are divided into two categories. Cij captures moving and
assimilation costs that are borne by the migrant. These would include transportation
costs, expenditures to learn the new language, ￿nd a job and obtain necessary licences
to practice a profession etc. Vij represents policy induced costs borne by the migrant
to overcome the legal hurdles set by the destination country￿ s government￿ s policies.
These costs include visa fees, the bureaucratic barriers for citizenship or even the
amount paid to smugglers above the normal cost of transportation when legal entry
is restricted. For simpli￿cation, we slightly abuse the terminology and refer to Cij
as migration costs and to Vij as visa costs. They both depend on the existing
diaspora networks and human capital level of the migrant as explained below. The
main motivation to di⁄erentiate between these two types of costs is to identify the
role of government￿ s policy on migration ￿ ows and characteristics.
Let Ni denote the size of the native population that is within migration age in
country i. When the random term follows an iid extreme-value distribution, we can
apply the results in McFadden (1974) to write the probability that a type-h individual











exp[wjh + Aj ￿ Cij(h) ￿ Vij(h)]
P
k exp[wkh + Ak ￿ Cik(h) ￿ Vk(h)]













= (wj ￿ wi)h + (Aj ￿ Ai) ￿ Cij(:) ￿ Vij(:) (1)
The ratio of immigrants to di⁄erent destinations (Nij=Nik) or migrants to the same
destination with di⁄erent human capital levels may be expressed using similar ex-
pressions.
Migration costs, Cij, depend on factors such as physical distance (di;j), destination
and origin countries￿social, cultural and linguistic characteristics (xi;yj) as well as
human capital level (h) of the migrant and the size of the diaspora abroad (Mi;j).
Thus, we write
Cij(h) = c(dij;Mij;xi;yj;h) (2)
Distance has a negative e⁄ect on migration so c
0
d > 0. Because social networks
lower information, assimilation and adaptation costs, diaspora has a positive e⁄ect on
migration and lowering of costs so c
0
M < 0. The assumption c
0
h < 0 captures the facts
that skilled migrants are better informed than the unskilled, have higher capacity to
assimilate or have more adaptive skills and, thus, face lower migration costs. Finally,
we assume that the advantages of being skilled are likely to be more important when
the diaspora size is small and migrants can not rely on others. When the diaspora
size is larger, the cost advantages of being skilled decline, i.e. c
00
hM > 0.6
The legal (or the visa) costs, Vij, are determined by the destination country j￿ s
government￿ s policies and depend on various factors. These policies can be speci￿c
to sending country i or depend on individual characteristics of the migrants. Many
destination countries have speci￿c programs for family reuni￿cation or for highly
skilled individuals. Other countries sign bilateral free mobility agreements or grant
automatic citizenship based on colonial links, common ethnicity or religion. The
green card lottery program of the US, for example, has country-speci￿c quotas.
Diasporas a⁄ect the visa costs mainly through family reuni￿cation programs. Let
fj denote the generosity of the family reuni￿cation program of country j which gener-
ally does not discriminate between di⁄erent origin countries. The probability that a
potential migrant from country i has a relative in country j is an increasing function




The migrant￿ s human capital level also a⁄ects the visa costs if there are selective
immigration programs such as the H1-B program in the US. We denote the generosity
of economic migration programs as ej and the overall e⁄ect of human capital on visa
costs depends on ejh. Finally, we formalize the presence of free mobility agreements
(such as those between EU members) through a dummy variable bij which is equal
6Analyzing the Mexican migration to the US, Mc Kenzie and Rapoport (2007) provide evidence
that the decrease in migration costs due to the network e⁄ect is stronger for low skilled migrants.
11to one if an agreement exists. As a result, we de￿ne visa costs as







Policy variables, fj and ej, only matter for origin countries that do not have free
mobility agreements with country j (when bij = 0). The partial derivatives of v(:)








ee ? 0 and
v
00
ef(:) > 0: the probability that an individual relies on family reunion program de-
creases (resp. increases) when economic program becomes more (resp. less) generous
or vice versa.
The net e⁄ect of human capital level on visa costs is given by
@Vij
@h









The e⁄ect of human capital on visa costs also depend on the size of the diaspora.
When the diaspora size is bigger, the probability that a migrant relies on an economic
migration program declines and the probability he relies on family reunion programs
increases. Hence, we have
@ (@Vij=@h)
@Mij




























This simple model and the underlying assumptions allow us to analyze major
characteristics of diasporas, especially how the existing diaspora in￿ uences the size of
migrant ￿ ows, their composition in terms of human capital and concentration across
di⁄erent destinations. Before proceeding to these questions, we ￿rst analyze how
changes in human capital level in￿ uence the migration decision of the individual and
the overall migration level. From equation (4), we have
@ ln[Nij(h)=Nii(h)]
@h
= (wj ￿ wi) ￿ c
0
h ￿ (1 ￿ bij)ejv
0
e (5)
which is positive if ￿c
0







> wi ￿ wj
7.
7In practice, some reported zeros might not re￿ ect the actual absence of migrants. Due to
con￿dentiality and disclosure rules, some statistics o¢ ces report a zero when the diaspora size is
lower than a threshold value. We are not able to distinguish these cases from "true" zeros.
12In the case of South-North migration, we have wj > wi and, therefore, above
condition always holds. Hence, level of of migration increases with human capital
levels and positive selection is observed. Positive selection is even stronger when






are large and when the host country has a
selective immigration policy (i.e. ej is large). We should note that positive selection
does not imply that there are more skilled emigrants than unskilled emigrants, but
the higher-skilled have a higher propensity to migrate. If the proportion of the highly-
skilled among natives is low (such as in Africa), there will still be more unskilled than
skilled migrants in destination countries. However, the ratio of the skilled to the
unskilled will be higher among migrants when compared to natives. For other types
of migration (between rich and rich, between poor and poor, or from rich to poor
countries), we might have wj ￿wi < 0. In that case, negative selection could emerge.
Diaspora Externalities
We now turn to diaspora e⁄ects on the size and structure of migration ￿ ows. First,
from (4), a large diaspora in destination j unambiguously increases current migration










f > 0 (6)
The overall impact depends on the e⁄ect of networks on migration costs (c
0
M) and
on the generosity of family reunion programs (fj) together with the e⁄ect on visa
costs (v
0
f). Second, we show that a larger diaspora in country j reduce the ￿ positive










ef < 0 (7)
Immigration Policies
What are the implications of these results for immigration policies? Obviously,
a more generous immigration policies, both in terms of family reuni￿cation and eco-
nomic immigration programs, at destination increase the size of immigration ￿ ows:
@ ln[Nij(h)=Nii(h)]
@fj





f > 0 (8)
@ ln[Nij(h)=Nii(h)]
@ej
= ￿(1 ￿ bij):h:v
0
e > 0 (9)
Immigration policies also a⁄ect the selection of immigrants. Since v
00
ef is positive,
stronger emphasis on family reunion programs (higher fj) reduces the quality (i.e.
the positive selection) of immigrants:
@2 ln[Nij(h)=Nii(h)]
@h@fj






13The e⁄ect of stronger economic migration programs (higher ej) on the selection of
immigrant is somewhat ambiguous since the ￿rst term of the expression below is
positive and the second term is negative. A close inspection, however, shows that the
net e⁄ect is likely to be positive unless v
00
ee is strongly negative.
@2 ln[Nij(h)=Nii(h)]
@h@ej
= ￿(1 ￿ bij):v
0
e ￿ (1 ￿ bij):ej:h:v
00
ee ? 0
Our simple model provides many interesting insights and gives rise to many
testable predictions. Due to data availability (especially, in the absence of detailed
data on bilateral immigration policies), we focus on some important predictions of
the empirical section. These can be summarized as follows:
￿ The e⁄ect of diasporas on the migration ￿ ows is unambiguously positive. This
impact is composed of the reduction of migration costs and visa costs through
a stronger family reuni￿cation e⁄ect. Both e⁄ects yield a total positive impact.
￿ The e⁄ect of diasporas on the selection of migrants and the skill ratio is negative.
A larger diaspora lowers migration and visa costs for all skill levels but the
intensity of reduction is stronger for low-skilled migrants.
￿ The impact of diasporas on the concentration level should be in line with the
e⁄ect in terms of selection. In particular, if diasporas tends to bene￿t a nega-
tive selection process, it should increase the concentration of low-skill migrants
compared to the concentration of high-skill migrants.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the determinants of the important characteristics of inter-
national migration ￿ ows - their size, their educational composition and their relative
concentration by education level across di⁄erent destination countries. In particular,
in line with the theoretical model, we assess the impact of existing diasporas as well
as other factors that in￿ uence migration ￿ ows. We start with OLS regressions but
also account for important econometric problems using other techniques. The ￿rst
important issue is the high proportion of observations with either zero or unde￿ned
values8. The second one is the correlation between the diaspora size and the error
term, due to the presence of some unobservable bilateral components that a⁄ect both
the size of the diaspora and migration ￿ ows. One important aspect of the whole
analysis is the robustness of the main results to alternative estimation techniques.
8Some reported zeros might not re￿ ect the actual absence of migrants. Due to con￿dentiality
and disclosure rules, some national statistics o¢ ces report zero when the diaspora size is below a
threshold level. We are not able to distinguish these cases from "true" zeros.
144.1 Size
The ￿rst question we ask is on determinants of migration ￿ ows and the role of the
diaspora size. In equation (4), the dependent variable is ln[Nij(h)], i.e. the log of the
migration ￿ ow between 1990 and 2000 from country i to country j of individuals with
skill level h. We proxy it by taking the di⁄erence of the migration stocks observed in
1990 and 2000.
Among the main determinants of migration ￿ ows in equation (4) are the wage dif-
ferential (speci￿c to each skill level), migration costs and the factors in￿ uencing visa
costs and other legal barriers. In Appendix B, we report the data sources and the way
we construct measure the explanatory variables that proxy determinants of migration
￿ ows. We have good estimates for skill prices in destination countries (wj) but fairly
imprecise data on wages at origin (wi) in order to construct the wage di⁄erential
variable (wj ￿ wi). One way of resolving this problem is to include origin country
dummies ￿i that capture the combined e⁄ect of all unobserved characteristics of the
origin country i on the migration ￿ ow to country j. These origin country dummies
also capture the role of stock of residents with education level h (ln[Nii(h)]) as well
all migration costs speci￿c to the origin country (xi) in equation (4). Pair-speci￿c
factors in￿ uencing migration costs are captured by geographical distance between the
two countries, colonial links (a dummy variable) and linguistic proximity. We also
introduce a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries are subject to the
Schengen agreement favouring the mobility of persons within the European Commu-
nity. The set Aj includes destination-speci￿c variables that a⁄ect the attractiveness
of country j in terms of migration such as population sizea and social expenditures as
a share of GDP (as a measure of the extent of social welfare). The proxy for selective
immigration policies is measured by the share of refugees in immigrants admitted in
1990 by country j. Finally, we capture diaspora e⁄ects by size of the diaspora in
1990 and denoted by the variable Mi;j: It should be clear that the estimated impact
of Mi;j in the estimation is a combined e⁄ect through Cij (network e⁄ects that lower
migration costs) and the impact on Vij (family reuni￿cation e⁄ects that lower visa
costs).
Introducing these variables, we get a ￿rst speci￿cation for the migration ￿ ow with
observable destination speci￿c variables:
ln[Nij(h)] = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Mij) + ￿2di;j + ￿3wj + ￿4Aj + ￿i + ￿ij (10)
where ln[Nij(h)]is the change in the migrant stock observed between 1990 and 2000
from country i to country j with education level h, Mij is the size of the diaspora
in 1990, di;j is a vector of other observable bilateral variables a⁄ecting the migration
costs as described above, wj is the level of wages at destination and Aj is a set of
other destination speci￿c variables thought to a⁄ect the attractiveness of country j.
Above speci￿cation assumes that the e⁄ect of all destination country speci￿c vari-
ables is well captured by wj and Aj. This is obviously a strong assumption as it is
15very likely that other factors play a signi￿cant role in attracting migrants in country
j. In addiition, some variable such as the immigration policy might be measured in
an imprecise way. The empirical measurement of immigration policies is a well known
challenge in the literature and has so far not received a full satisfying treatment. Since
we are mainly interested in estimating the impact of Mij , in the next speci￿cation,
we introduce destination country dummies ￿j that capture the combined impact of
unobserved characteristics of host countries:
ln[Nij(h)] = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Mij) + ￿2di;j + ￿j + ￿i + ￿ij: (11)
Compared to the previous model in (10), introduction of destination country
dummies lead to an improvement of the speci￿cation and thus can minimize the
case of a misspeci￿cation bias. Our results in the next section show that insertion of
destination ￿xed e⁄ects leads to an increase in the R2 by more than 10 percents. This
model should thus be preferred, at least as far the estimation of ￿1 is concerned.9
4.2 Selection
We use the selection ratio, the number of skilled over unskilled migrants, as the proxy
for educational (or the human capital) structure of migration ￿ ows and diasporas. It
is de￿ned as Sij =
Mij(s)
Mij(u), where Mij(s) and Mij(u) refer to the number of skilled
and unskilled migrants respectively. In line with Grogger and Hanson (2008) and
the original de￿nition in Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2007), we de￿ne skilled and
unskilled migrants as migrants with post-secondary and primary education levels,
respectively . Equation (4) can be manipulated to be written in terms of the ratio of
di⁄erent skill levels to the same destination as a result of the extreme-value assump-
tion of the error term. Depending on the introduction of destination dummies or not,
the estimated equations are :
ln(Sij) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Mij) + ￿2di;j + ￿3wj + ￿4Aj + ￿i + ￿ij (12)
and
ln(Sij) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Mij) + ￿2di;j + ￿j + ￿i + ￿ij (13)
The availability of data for 1990 also allows us to study the impact of diaspora on
the change in the selection ratio (which is broadly equal to the selection ratio of new
migrants). The two estimated speci￿cations are then obtained by substituting ln(Sij)
by its change between 1990 and 2000, ￿ln(Sij).
9Of course, the cost of adopting speci￿cation (11) is that, we can not estimate the impact of
destination speci￿c variables such as the wage levels wj in host countries. Please refer to Rosenzweig
(2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) for a discussion.
164.3 Relative concentration
We also explore the relative concentration of diasporas across education levels. In
particular, we ask whether diasporas tend to lead to more concentration of unskilled
rather than skilled migrants at a given destination. We construct our destination-



















where indices s and u refer to skilled and unskilled migrants. A nice property of
this bilateral measure is that its sum across destination countries j boils down to the
di⁄erence between Her￿ndhal indices for skilled and unskilled migrants.
Once again, we consider regression models with and without destination dummies
and consider regression on levels (relative concentration Cs
ij ￿ Cu
ij observed in 2000)











ij = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Mij) + ￿2di;j + ￿j + ￿i + ￿ij (15)
The speci￿cations relative to the changes are obtained by substituting Cs
ij ￿ Cu
ij
relative to 2000 by ￿(Cs
ij￿Cu
ij) where ￿ refers to the change between 1990 and 2000.
The latter speci￿cation is particularly demanding since the dependent measures "a
di⁄erence in di⁄erences" of concentration rates.
4.4 Econometric issues
The estimation of models (10-15) entails several econometric challenges that might
lead the estimation of those models by OLS to generate inconsistent estimates. There
are two basic reasons. The ￿rst one is related to the occurrence of zero or unde￿ned
values for the dependent variables in a large portion of the observations. The second
one is the potential correlation of ln(Mij) with ￿ij due to the presence of an unob-
servable component a⁄ecting the size of the diasporas and the characteristics of new
migrants. We now discuss how we address these issues
4.4.1 Zero or unde￿ned values for dependent variables
One of the most important features of our dataset is the high proportion of zero
observations either for the size of diasporas in 2000 or for the ￿ ows of migrants
between 1990 and 2000. This naturally occurs in many migration datasets as there
is almost none or minimal migration for many country pairs. Pooling the data across
the two periods, we have zero values in about 31% of the observations for the stock
of migrants and in around 36% for the ￿ ows.
17Our model is fully consistent with such large number of zero observations. Pre-
dicting a continuous number of emigrants, our model is an approximation of the
"discrete-number" real world with Nij(h) 2 N. If ln[Nij(h)] < 0, less than one mi-
grant wants to leave her country10. This means that the bilateral migration ￿ ow is
nil. The probability that Ni;j(h) = 0 is
Pr[(wj ￿ wi)h + (Aj ￿ Ai) ￿ Cij ￿ Vij + ln[Nii(h)] < 0]
This case might arise for a number of reasons such as low wage di⁄erentials, large
distances, high migration or visa costs. In turn, those latter costs obviously depend
on the size of the existing diaspora.
Large number of zero observations occurs frequently in other empirical studies in
international economics such as gravity equations in trade models. In the estimation
of models (10-11) by OLS for the size of migration ￿ ows, the high occurance of zero
values is likely to lead to inconsistent estimates. The use of a log speci￿cation drops
the zero observations from the sample which is likely to result in biased estimates of
the impact of diasporas and other variables on the migration ￿ ows and their selection.
For instance, it might be the case that there are no migrants from country i to country
j because migration costs are too high. In turn, migration costs might be too high
because distance is too high and there is no diaspora. In this case, the exclusion of
those observations leads to underestimation of the impact of the variables a⁄ecting
the migration costs such as distance, colonial links, linguistic similarities or diasporas.
The ￿rst alternative is to use Poisson regression models that relies on pseudo
maximum likelihood estimates, as advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
who show that the use of log linearization for gravity models leads to inconsistent
estimates of the coe¢ cients (such as the one relative to distance). A ￿rst reason, as
mentioned before, is the exclusion of zero observations for the dependent variable. A
second reason is that the expected value of the error will depend on the covariates
of the model and hence will lead to estimation biases of the coe¢ cient. In order to
address that, we carry out Poisson regressions of the models explaining the size of the
migration ￿ ows (i.e. models 10-11). The Poisson solution is nevertheless unfeasible
for the selection and the concentration analyses. For the selection, the existence of
zero values for Mi;j(h) leads to unde￿ned values for Sij, which cannot be handled
by the Poisson approach.11 For the concentration regressions, we end up with many
10In practice, some reported zeros might not re￿ ect the actual absence of migrants. Due to
con￿dentiality and disclosure rules, some statistics o¢ ces report a zero when the diaspora size is
lower than a threshold value. We are not able to distinguish these cases from "true" zeros.
11Strictly speaking, the estimation of models (12-13) leaves out a set of observations for two
reasons. The main reason is that the selection ratio is unde￿ned due to the fact that Mij(u) = 0;
i.e. the size of the unskilled diaspora is equal to zero. Poolling the data across the time periods,
the fact that there is no unskilled diaspora leads to the exclusion of 35.7% of the observation. A
second minor reason is that the use of the log of the skill ratio leaves out observations for which we
observed Mij(s) = 0 and Mij(u) > 0; i.e. a diaspora with some unskilled migrants but no skilled
18negative values (more concentration for the unskilled compared to the skilled), which
precludes the use of Poisson regression since they are count data models.12
A second alternative involves techniques accounting explicitly for a potential se-
lection bias by two-step Heckman regression. In general, for all the features that we
analyze (migration ￿ ows, selection and relative concentration), the ￿rst step involves
the estimation of a selection equation - the probability for a given country pair to
have a positive migration ￿ ow.13 The usual procedure implies the use of an instru-
ment in the probit equation, i.e. a bilateral variable that in￿ uences the probability
of observing a diaspora between the two countries but does not in￿ uence the size of
this diaspora.
It is di¢ cult to ￿nd such an instrument but one possible candidate is diplomatic
representation of the destination country in the origin country. Diplomatic represen-
tation might a⁄ect the probability of having at least one migrant by setting some
kind of threshold on the initial migration and visa costs faced by potential migrants.
In the absence of any diplomatic representation of country j in country i, the cost to
get a visa can simply be too high so that nobody would consider to migrate to coun-
try j: The role of diplomatic representation in the migration process is to a certain
extent analogous to the role played by a common religion for trade relationships. As
argued by Helpman et al.(2007), a common religion (a proxy of costs of establishing
business linkages) a⁄ects the extensive margin of trade (i.e. the probability of export)
but not the intensive margin (i.e. trade volumes). In regressions (10-13), the use of
a two-step Heckman approach yields intuitive results both for the ￿ ow and for the
selection equation. In particular, for the selection equation, we ￿nd that diplomatic
representation of country j in county i tends to positively a⁄ect the probability of
observing a diaspora of country i in country j. Furthermore, the mills ratio turns out
to be signi￿cant in the ￿ ow equation, suggesting that accounting for a selection bias
is important.
Since the observed level of diaspora in 1990 is used as a regressor, the use of diplo-
matic representation leads to some collinarity problems in the selection equation. In
order to mitigate the collinearity problems, it is possible to run Heckman two-step
migrants. The log transformation leads to a further exclusion of 256 pairs of countries (for 1990 and
2000), i.e. to an additional exclusion of 2.1% of the total observations.
12For the relative concentration, we could include in the OLS regressions zero values. Nevertheless,
in order to have consistent subsamples with the analysis of selection and size, we consider a subsample
of pairs for which we have non zero values for Cs
ij ￿Cu
ij: These zero values are exclusivelyrelated to
zero values for both concentration indexes , i.e. correspond to Cs
ij = 0 and Cu
ij = 0: In other words,
we have no case for which concentration levels would be positive and exactly similar between skilled
and unskilled.
13To be more precise, for the analysis of migration stock, the probability that a given observation
will be included in the regression is directly related to the probability of observing a diaspora (either
regardless of the skill level, either for a particular skill level) for this country pair. For the migration
￿ ows, the probability is exactly the same since we have no case of zero migration ￿ ow with positive
values of the stock in 1990 and 2000. For the analysis of selection, the probability is related to the
existence of a diaspora or at least a skilled diaspora.
19regressions without any additional instrument. As stressed by Wooldridge (2002),
the use of an additional instrument in the probit equation is not strictly necessary.
The drawback of not using an additional instrument is that the Mills ratio might
become highly collinear with the explanatory variables of the ￿ ow equation, which in
turn lowers the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients. This is not the case for most of our
regressions. This method will therefore be used in the benchmark regressions. Nev-
ertheless, as a robustness check, we carry out the same regressions using diplomatic
representation as an instrument (See Appendix A).
4.4.2 Correlated unobservables with the diaspora
One issue in identifying and estimating endogenous social e⁄ects (like the network
e⁄ects in this paper) is the presence of unobservable correlated e⁄ects as explained
by Manski (1993). In our framework, it could be the case that unobservable bilateral
components a⁄ect the size of the diaspora Mij and the dependent variables. For
instance, unobserved cultural proximity between country i and country j might a⁄ect
simultaneously the stock of migrants, the current ￿ ows of new migrants and their
selection. The cross-sectional nature of the data prevents us to estimate directly
those unobservable components. Therefore, those e⁄ects will be included in the error
term, which in turn leads to some kind of omitted variable bias and to some correlation
between Mij and the error term.
We follow Munshi (2003) and proceed to a variable instrumental estimation of
model (11) and (13) in order to address this issue and check the robustness of the
results. In each case, we consider two instruments, i.e. variables correlated with
Mij but uncorrelated with the migration ￿ ows or the selection ratio. The use of two
instruments allows us to check the empirical validity of this second condition through
Hansen over-identi￿cation tests. Our ￿rst instrument is a dummy variable capturing
whether the two countries were subject to a temporary guest worker agreement in
the 60￿ s and 70￿ s. One can expect those guest worker agreements to exert a strong
impact on the initial formation of a stock of migrants in the 60￿ s and the 70￿ s, hence
in￿ uencing the stock in 1990. In contrast, it is unclear why those initial agreements
would in￿ uence the contemporaneous migration ￿ ows beyond the impact exerted by
the diaspora itself. Examples of such a process are illustrated by the impact of the
post-war guest worker agreements between Belgium and Italy or Spain.
The second instrument is a variable capturing the unobserved diaspora in the 60￿ s
through a combination of variables representing some push factor in country i, size
in country i; openness and size in country j and distance between i and j. The basic
measure is
IVij ￿ ln(popi ￿ immstj=distij) ￿ confli
where popi is the population size in the 60￿ s of country i, immstj is the immigration
stock of country j in the 60￿ s, distij is the distance between i and j and confli is a
dummy variable capturing the occurrence of armed con￿ icts in country i during the
2060￿ s.
Our instrument should be correlated with the size of the diaspora observed in
1990. The variable popi is used as a proxy for the size of potential migrants in
sending country i while immstj is a proxy of the openness and the size of the receiving
country j in the 60￿ s. The product of the two is divided by the distance between the
two countries captures the size of migration costs. This variable is multiplied by
the con￿ ict variable speci￿c to the sending country to capture push factors causing
people to leave country i. If this last variable is not correlated too much over time,
this should impact the stock of migrants in the 60￿ s but not the ￿ ows of migrants
coming from country i in subsequent periods such as the 1990-2000 period. In other
terms, the low degree of serial correlation in the confl variable ensures that our IVij
variable is uncorrelated with our dependent variable, as the usual over identi￿cation
test supports the exclusion restriction.
We only consider con￿ icts observed between 1946 and 1960 in order to capture
push-factors leading to emigration in the 1950s and 1960s. We distinguish minor
con￿ icts (number of battle-related deaths between 25 and 999) denoted CONFL1 and
wars (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year) denoted CONFL2. We ￿rst
use CONFL1; then we use CONFL2 and ￿nally we add up the two variables. F-stat
statistics of ￿rst stage regressions show that the correlation between this instrument
set and the diaspora is relatively high. The results of the Hansen over-identi￿cation
test suggest furthermore that the second condition of no correlation between the
instrument set and the error term is supported by the data.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Impact on ￿ ows
Table 2 presents the estimation results regarding the determinants of migration ￿ ows
and especially the role of diasporas. Columns (1) through (4) report the results on
aggregate ￿ ows while columns (5) through (8) give the results for low-skilled and high-
skilled migration ￿ ows. The OLS estimates of equations (10) and (11) are presented
in columns (1) and (2) where a signi￿cant number of observations with zero migration
￿ ows (and the size of the diaspora in 1990) are dropped. Columns (3) through (8)
report the results from the two-step Heckman approach where the regressions without
additional instruments are used as the benchmark.
In appendix A, we check the robustness of the results presented in Table 2. Table
A1 presents the coe¢ cients obtained with using diplomatic representation as an ad-
ditional instrument in the Heckman regressions. Table A2 presents the results of the
Poisson regressions. As expected, we ￿nd that diplomatic representation signi￿cantly
increases the probability of having a diaspora at destination, re￿ ected by the positive
and signi￿cant coe¢ cient in the selection equation. In all Heckman regressions, the
Mills ratio is statistically signi￿cant, which suggests that dealing with the large num-
21ber of zero observations is important. However a comparison of the results in Table
2 with those in Tables A1 and A2 reveals that the estimated coe¢ cient of the lagged
diaspora variable is strikingly robust across estimation methods. Therefore, we focus
on Table 2 in discussing the implications of our results.
Migration costs, as captured by bilateral distance and linguistic proximity vari-
ables, are found to exert signi￿cant e⁄ects on the migration ￿ ows whereas Schengen
agreement seems to favor migration of highly skilled workers. Besides those pre-
dictable results, the e⁄ect of diasporas on the migration ￿ ows is quite important with
a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient. In the case with both destination and origin
dummies, this coe¢ cient lies between 0.62 and 0.77. Note that the speci￿cation used
in (10-11) is similar to that of a ￿-convergence model. A positive coe¢ cient for the
lagged diaspora implies that there is no sign of convergence in the size of bilateral
stocks of migrants, even when controlling for country ￿xed e⁄ects (capturing popula-
tions, individual domestic policies and economic conditions that in￿ uence incentives
to migrate). This is probably due to the fact that migration to the North, especially
from the South, sharply increased during the nineties. Since our period of interest is
1990-2000, our results clearly illustrate that country pairs with large initial diasporas
exhibit higher growth rates compared to pairs with smaller diasporas.
As expected, OLS leads to an underestimated coe¢ cient due to the exclusion of
zero observations and the related selection bias. Methods that account for those zero
values lead to slightly higher estimates. The estimated coe¢ cient is almost the same
in the Heckman two-step and Poisson regressions, emphasizing the robustness of the
results. It is also quite similar whether we include an instrument in the selection
equation of the two-step Heckman approach (Table A1)14.
14With diplomatic representation used as an instrument in the selection equation, we get a coef-
￿cient of 0.660 for the impact of diaspora instead of 0.699 in the benchmark regressions. Note that
the di⁄erence is not exclusively due to the estimation method since the use of diplomatic represen-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Extracting the explained partial sum of squares using the results in column (1),
we ￿nd that diaspora e⁄ects explain more than 71% of the observed variability in
migration ￿ ows and over 80% of the explained variability of the model. This is a
rather high level given that the ￿t of the regression is quite high, with R2 amounting
to 89%. Columns (5) and (6) report the results for the low-skill migrants while
columns (7) and (8) report the results for the high-skill ones. The diaspora e⁄ect
is higher for low-skill migrants as predicted in our model. This is due to the fact
a large diaspora lowers the advantage higher levels of human capital generate in
lowering migration and visa costs. The di⁄erential impact of diasporas on low-skill
migration is again highly robust to alternative speci￿cations (i.e. with and without
destination country dummies) and to alternative estimation methods. A Wald test
on the di⁄erence of coe¢ cients of ￿1 between low and high-skilled migrants (columns
5 and 7) shows that this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. Note
that the e⁄ects of distance and linguistic proximity are also higher for low-skilled
than for the high-skilled migrants. The latter result re￿ ects the fact that linguistic
proximity increases the degree of transferability of skills and the ease of entry into
the labor market for the low-skilled migrants.
Table 3 presents the instrumental variable estimates of equation (11) with three
di⁄erent sets of instruments. All sets pass the F-stat test for the strength of instru-
ments and the Hansen J-test of no correlation with the error term at the 5% level.
The results of the IV estimation lead to very similar coe¢ cients for the impact of
the diaspora on the migration ￿ ows. The decrease in signi￿cance is mainly caused
by the increase in uncertainty due to the instrumentation procedure. Nevertheless,
the quantitative and statistical signi￿cance of the diaspora remains. Therefore, we
conclude that the strong e⁄ect of diasporas documented in OLS regressions is robust
to the various econometric problems including selection bias and correlation of the
diaspora with unobserved factors of the ￿ ows.




Lagged diasp 0.761 0.766 0.758
(10.92)*** (11.09)*** (10.86)***
Col links -0.051 -0.064 -0.045
(0.26) (0.32) (0.23)
linguage 0.234 0.228 0.236
(2.27)** (2.22)** (2.29)**
Log(dist) -0.259 -0.253 -0.262
(2.84)*** (2.78)*** (2.86)***
Schengen 0.160 0.161 0.160
(1.11) (1.11) (1.11)
Constant 2.365 2.306 2.392
(2.69)*** (2.64)*** (2.72)***
Orig Dum Yes Yes Yes
Dest Dum Yes Yes Yes
Method IV IV IV
F-stat First stage 27.51 26.15 27.29
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.128 0.0640 0.101
R2 0.883 0.882 0.883
Observations 3486 3486 3486
Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Instrument sets for Mij in all columns include a dummy for bilateral guest worker
agreement and a proxy for diaspora size in 1960. In column (1) , the proxy is computed as
ln(popi ￿ immstj=distij) ￿ Conf1i;In column (2) , the proxy is computed as
ln(popi ￿ immstj=distij) ￿ Conf2i;in column (3), the proxy is computed as
ln(popi ￿ immstj=distij) ￿ (conf1i + Conf2i):
5.2 Impact on selection
The next question is on the determinants of the selection and the human capital
(educational) composition of migrants and the speci￿c role of diasporas in this process.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4 report the results of the estimation of equations (12) and
(13) for the skill ratio whereas columns (5) and (6) are estimated for the change in the
skill ratio. Columns (1) and (2) are obtained using OLS whereas results in columns
(3) to (6) are obtained with the Heckman two-step procedure without instruments.
26Table 4. Impact of diaspora on selection (ratio high-skill/low-skill)
level and change: OLS and Heckman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skill ratio Skill ratio Skill ratio Skill ratio ￿SR ￿SR
Lagged diasp -0.171 -0.088 -0.194 -0.132 -0.143 -0.108
(16.19)*** (8.47)*** (20.62)*** (11.83)*** (17.62)*** (11.47)***
Col. links -0.042 -0.439 -0.022 -0.410 0.101 0.096
(0.62) (6.08)*** (0.32) (5.21)*** (1.67)* (1.46)
linguage 0.466 0.703 0.460 0.721 0.176 0.257
(9.38)*** (11.03)*** (9.37)*** (11.68)*** (4.17)*** (4.95)***
Log(dist) 0.096 0.273 0.090 0.263 0.086 0.116
(3.35)*** (10.17)*** (3.40)*** (9.96)*** (3.78)*** (5.25)***
Schengen 0.502 0.305 0.519 0.303 0.390 0.117
(5.65)*** (3.14)*** (6.26)*** (2.97)*** (5.48)*** (1.37)
Immig pol -0.014 -0.015 0.001
(4.98)*** (5.52)*** (0.30)
Soc exp -1.206 -1.253 -0.756
(16.11)*** (20.12)*** (14.42)***
Pop. at dest 0.061 0.082 0.056
(3.45)*** (4.58)*** (3.75)***
Wage at dest 0.044 0.045 0.035
(9.86)*** (10.47)*** (9.78)***
Constant -1.109 0.002 -0.734 0.257 -1.250 -0.563
(1.16) (0.00) (1.32) (0.34) (2.54)** (0.87)
Dest dum Yes No Yes No Yes No
Orig dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
Mills -0.380 -0.446 -0.10 -0.99
(6.86)*** (7.37)*** (0.22) (1.88)*
Obs 3604 3084 5760 4992 5760 4992
R-squared 0.60 0.45
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Results in Table 4 show that the selection of migrants is also in￿ uenced by a large
set of variables. Bilateral varaibles such as linguistic proximity, distance, the Schengen
agreement and wage di⁄erentials favor the selection of high-skilled migrants. On the
contrary, non-selective immigration policies and generous social expenditures lower
the educational mix of the migrants which is in line with the results in Cohen and
Razin (2008). More importantly, large diasporas exert a strong negative impact on
the skill ratio of migration ￿ ows and attract low-skill migrants. Once again, this e⁄ect
is robust to alternative speci￿cations (presence or absence of destination dummies),
27estimation methods (OLS and Heckman). More importantly, this strong result is
maintained when we use the change in the skill ratio between 1990 and 2000 as the
dependent variable instead of the level of the skill ratio.
From the results in column (1), we ￿nd that diaspora e⁄ects explain respectively
47% and 78% of the total and explained variability of the selection ratio in 2000.
These numbers suggest that, compared to economic or other selection variables, di-
aspora e⁄ects are rather important. As stated earlier, the diaspora e⁄ect is com-
plemetary to the generosity of family reunion programs. The size of the diaspora
e⁄ect will be smaller in the absence of .reuni￿cation programs in the destination
country and will be limited to lowering of migration costs through the network ef-
fects. These results imply that education-based selective migration policies are likely
to have only moderate impact in countries hosting large diasporas unless the extent
of family reuni￿cation programs are curtailed.
Table 5 reports the results of the IV estimation for the skill ratio of migration
￿ ows. Columns (1) through (3) look at the impact on the level of the ratio while
Columns (4) through (6) investigate the impact on its change. Similar to the analysis
of migration ￿ ows, we consider three di⁄erent sets of instruments and the IV results
con￿rm the negative impact of diasporas on the educational composition of migrant
￿ ows from the previous table.
5.3 Concentration
Our last question is on the determinants of the relative concentration of migrants of
di⁄erent skill levels and the role diasporas play. The structure of Table 6 is similar
to the that of Table 4. Colonial links tend to favor a higher concentration of low-skill
migrants compared to high-skill ones, while distance exerts the opposite e⁄ect. Once
again, diaspora e⁄ects are found to be important for explaining the concentration
levels and the e⁄ect is robust to alternative speci￿cations, alternative estimation
methods. And the results also hold for the change in the relative concentration index





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 6. Explaining relative concentration between high-skill and
low-skill and change in relative concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rel conc Rel conc Rel conc Rel conc ￿RC ￿RC
Lagged diasp -0.502 -0.294 -0.514 -0.347 -0.008 -0.008
(5.87)*** (3.54)*** (9.67)*** (5.73)*** (16.05)*** (15.45)***
Col. links -4.635 -7.085 -4.619 -7.008 -0.040 -0.043
(4.68)*** (6.41)*** (10.69)*** (14.75)*** (9.93)*** (10.45)***
Language 0.338 0.373 0.321 0.369 -0.004 -0.005
(0.84) (0.78) (1.09) (1.02) (1.58) (1.75)*
Log(dist) 0.266 0.628 0.269 0.615 0.006 0.006
(1.24) (3.73)*** (1.69)* (3.91)*** (3.78)*** (4.26)***
Schengen -0.193 -0.076 -0.180 -0.068 0.002 0.001
(0.50) (0.16) (0.36) (0.11) (0.49) (0.26)
Pop. at dest 0.956 0.988 0.003
(7.13)*** (9.33)*** (3.50)***
Immig pol -0.014 -0.013 0.000
(1.31) (0.84) (1.51)
Soc exp -1.509 -1.573 0.002
(4.38)*** (4.44)*** (0.52)
Wage at dest 0.217 0.217 0.001
(7.69)*** (8.57)*** (4.68)***
Constant 5.607 -18.397 -3.240 -10.824 -0.037 -0.111
(0.29) (4.70)*** (1.19) (2.77)*** (1.60) (3.33)***
Dest dum Yes No Yes No Yes No
Orig dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
Mills -0.405 -0.680 -0.873 -1.684
(1.07) (1.94)** (2.44)** (6.12)***
Observations 3920 3367 5730 4966 5730 4966
R-squared 0.29 0.17
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
305.4 Non-linear e⁄ects
It is important to explore potential non-linear e⁄ects in our econometric speci￿cation,
especially given the nature of the mechanism through which diasporas are expected
to impact the characteristics of migration ￿ ows. Two sources of non-linearity can
be expected. First, as the size of a diaspora expands, the marginal impact of an
additional migrant could decline. Fortunately, the logarithmic speci￿cation accounts
for this source of non-linearity.
Another potential issue is that diasporas below a certain size could be ine⁄ective
in lowering migration costs. In other words, smaller diasporas might lead to relatively
high search costs for potential migrants, mitigating the positive e⁄ects reported in
the previous tables. This possibility argues for presence of threshold e⁄ects in the
impact of diasporas. In order to check the existence of such a threshold, we run




















with Xij = Nij or Sij, f Ms
ij ￿ Max[Mij ￿ M
s;1] and M
s, the threshold in diaspora
size, varying between 0 to 7,500 migrants. Hence, we look at the impact of diasporas
on the migration ￿ ows and on the migration selection, neutralizing the impact for
diasporas whose size is lower than M
s.
Given the distribution of the diaspora size, we roll over increments of 50 migrants






expect the standard error of b ￿
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1 to increase as M





decreases in a nonlinear way). For instance, when M






becomes higher than 89 percent. The estimation of b ￿
s
1 is then
based on a very low number of observations15. This tends to in￿ ate the standard
errors of b ￿
s
1.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the evolution of the estimated b ￿
s
1 along with values of M
s
with both estimations using Heckman two-step method. Both ￿gures suggest that the
impact of diasporas is slightly decreasing with the size of diasporas. The evolution
over time of the estimated b ￿
s
1￿ s does not suggest the existence of a minimum threshold
under which diasporas would be ine¢ cient. Consequently, those results are fully
consistent with the choice of a double log speci￿cation for models (11) and (13) and
values of j b ￿1 j< 1.
15Basically, the estimation will only rely on pairs of relatively large sending and receiving countries.
31Figure 3. Estimating b ￿
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1 with rolling regressions
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326 Conclusion
this paper explores the impact of existing diasporas on the number, skill composition
and concentration of international migrants. We ￿rst develop a simple theoretical
framework emphasizing the role of diasporas which operates through the lowering of
both migration costs (due to information and assimilation di¢ culties) and visa costs
(due to government policies). Diasporas lower migration costs through network ef-
fects and visa costs by increasing the probability of non economic migration through
family reuni￿cation programs. These two e⁄ects increase the size of migration ￿ ows
and reasonably reduce the selection of high-skill migrants. We then evaluate the
implications of the theoretical predictions using new bilateral migration data by ed-
ucational level. We estimate the role of existing networks in 1990 on the migration
￿ ows between 1990 and 2000, on their skill composition and on their relative con-
centration across educational levels. We account for potential problems related to
the nature of the data and check the robustness of initial OLS estimates. First, we
abstract from the bias induced by the log linearization of gravity models. Second,
we account for the occurrence of a potential selection bias due to the large number
of zeros in the country pairs. Third, we take into account a potential endogeneity
problem of existing diasporas through instrumental variable estimations. Our results
are extremely robust across estimation methods.
In short, we ￿nd evidence of a strong impact of existing diasporas. Regarding
size, diasporas are by far the most important determinant of migration ￿ ows even
after accounting for the usual variables a⁄ecting bilateral migration costs such as dis-
tance, colonial links and linguistic proximity. Extracting the explained partial sum
of squares, we ￿nd that 71 percent of the observed variability of the migration ￿ ows
is explained by diaspora e⁄ects. Regarding selection, diasporas are found to favor
more the migration of the low-skill than migration of the highly skilled. It therefore
exerts a strong negative impact on the selection of migrants. We ￿nd that diaspora
e⁄ects explain 47% of the total variability of the selection ratio in 2000. Disregarding
diaspora externalities but using much more detailed data on base wages and returns
to skill (captured in our ￿xed e⁄ects), Grogger and Hanson (2008) ￿nd that, on aver-
age, wage di⁄erences explain 58 percent of the immigrant skill gap. This suggests that
diaspora e⁄ects and wage di⁄erences leave little space for education-based selective
policies in determining the quantity and quality of immigrants. Our results suggest
that policies aiming at increasing the educational quality of the migrants might be
highly constrained by the existing migrant￿ s network. In the presence of large diaspo-
ras, more selective migration policies might fail unless family reuni￿cation programs
are deeply reformed and limited. The same holds for policies that would aim to favor
ethnic diversity of the migrants.
337 References
Bertolini, S. (2009), "Networks, Sorting and Self-selection of Ecuadorian Migrants",
Paper presented at the second TOM Meeting, Louvain-La-Neuve, January.
Borjas, G (1987), ￿Self-selection and the earnings of migrants￿ , American Eco-
nomic Review, 77 (4), 531-53.
Borjas, G.J. (1994), "The economics of immigration", Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 32, 1667-1717.
Borjas, G.J. (1995), "The economic bene￿ts from immigration", Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 9 (2), 3-22.
Borjas, G.J. (1999), Heaven￿ s door: immigration policy and the American econ-
omy, Princeton University Press.
Carrington, W.J., E. Detragiache and T. Vishwanath (1996), ￿Migration with
endogenous moving costs￿ , American Economic Review, 86 (4), 909-30.
Chiquiar, D. and G.H. Hanson (2005), ￿International migration, self-selection,
and the distribution of wages: evidence from Mexico and the United States￿ , Journal
of Political Economy, 113 (2), 239-81.
Clair, G., G. Gaullier, Th. Mayer and S. Zignago (2004), ￿A note on CEPII￿ s
distances measures￿ , Explanatory note, CEPII, Paris.
Cohen, A. and A. Razin (2008), "Skill composition of migration and the gen-
erosity of the welfare state: free vs. policy-restricted migration", Mimeo., Tel-Aviv
University.
Docquier, F. and E. Lodigiani (2008), "International migration and business net-
works", Open Economies Review, forthcoming.
Docquier, F., O. Lohest and A. Marfouk (2007), ￿Brain drain in developing coun-
tries￿ , World Bank Economic Review, 21, 193-218.
Docquier, F. and A. Marfouk (2006), ￿International migration by educational
attainment (1990-2000)￿ , in C. Ozden and M. Schi⁄ (eds). International Migration,
Remittances and Development, Palgrave Macmillan: New York (2006), chapter 5.
Docquier, F., B.L. Lowell and A. Marfouk (2007), ￿A gendered assessment of
highly skilled emigration￿ , Population and Development Review, forthcoming.
Friedberg, R.M. and J. Hunt (1995), "The impact of immigrants on the host
country wages, employment and growth", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 23-
44.
Gao, T.(2003), "Ethnic Chinese Networks and International Investment: Evidence
from Inward FDI in China", Journal of Asian Economics, 14, 611-629.
Gleditsch, P., M. Eriksson and M. Sollenberg (2002), "Armed Con￿ ict 1946-2001:
A New Dataset", Journal of Peace Research, 39 (5), 615-637.
Grogger, J and G.H. Hanson, 2008, "Income Maximisation and the selection and
sorting of international Migrants, NBER Working Paper, No. 13821.
Harbom, L., E. Melander and P. Wallensteen (2007), "Dyadic Dimensions of
Armed Con￿ ict, 1946￿ 2007", Journal of Peace Research, 45 (5), 697-710.
34Helpman, E., M. Melitz and Y. Rubinstein (2007), "Estimating Trade Flows:
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes", NBER Working Paper W12927.
Manski, C.F. (1993), "Identi￿cation of Endogeneous Social E⁄ects: the Relection
Problem", Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), 531-42.
Massey, D.S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J. E. Taylor
(1993), ￿Theories of international migration: Review and Appraisal,￿Population and
Development Review, 19 (3), 431-466.
McFadden, D. (1984), ￿Econometric analysis of qualitative response models￿ , in:
Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 2, Amster-
dam. Elsevier/North-Holland.
McKenzie, D. and H. Rapoport (2007), ￿Self-selection patterns in Mexico-US
migration: the role of migration networks￿ , Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming.
Munshi, K. (2003), ￿Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the
US labor market￿ , Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2), 549-99.
Pedersen, P.J., M. Pytlikova and N. Smith (2008),. "Selection and network e⁄ects￿
Migration ￿ ows into OECD countries 1990-2000", European Economic Review, 52 (7),
1160-1186.
Rapoport, H. and M. Kugler (2006), "Skilled Emigration, Business Networks and
Foreign Direct Investment", CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1455.
Rauch, J. (2003), "Diasporas and development: Theory, Evidence and Program-
matic Implications", Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego.
Rauch, J. and A. Casella (1998), "Anonymous Market and Group ties in Interna-
tional Trade", Journal of International Economics, vol 58(1):19-47.
Rauch, J. and V. Trindade (2002), "Ethnic Chinese Networks In International
Trade", The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1):116-130.
Razin, A. and E. Sadka (2004), " Welfare migration: Is the net ￿scal burden a
good measure of its economic impact on the welfare of the native-born population?",
NBER Working Paper 10682.
Rosenzweig, M (2008), The global Migration of Skill, Paper presented at the
Migration and Development Workshop, Lille, June.
Roy, A.D. (1951), ￿Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings￿ , Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 3 (2), 135-46.
Santos Silva, J.M.C. and S. Tenreyro (2006), "The Log of Gravity", Review of
Economics and Statistics, 88 (4): 641-658.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data,
MIT Press.
358 Appendix A - Robustness
Table A1 present the results obtained with diplomatic representation used as an
additional instrument. Table A2 presents the results obtained with the Poisson re-
gressions.
Table A1 : Determinants of migration ￿ ows
Heckman regressions with diplomatic representation as instrument
(1) (2) (3)
Total Low-skill High-skill
Lagged diasp 0.660 0.732 0.592
(47.97)*** (25.65)*** (47.40)***
Col links 0.219 0.296 0.224
(2.03)** (1.42) (2.37)**
linguage 0.477 0.315 0.658
(6.71)*** (2.42)** (10.25)***
Log(dist) -0.501 -0.686 -0.387
(12.04)*** (8.66)*** (10.71)***
Schengen 0.257 -0.090 0.610
(2.00)** (0.36) (5.54)***
Constant 2.785 1.789 2.408
(4.82)*** (1.44) (4.19)***
Dest dum Yes Yes Yes
Orig dum Yes Yes Yes
Method Heckman Heckman Heckman
Mills ratio 0.908 1.836 0.772
(7.60)*** (6.77)*** (8.60)***
Diplomatic representation 0.202 0.171 0.010
(2.36)** (2.39)** (1.08)
Observations 5610 5610 5610
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
36Table A2 : Determinants of migration ￿ ows (total and low skilled)
Poisson regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Total Low-skill Low-skill High-skill High-skill
Lagged diasp 0.703 0.740 0.743 0.784 0.644 0.706
(16.20)*** (22.06)*** (11.92)*** (15.09)*** (18.20)*** (22.70)***
Colonial links -0.312 -0.375 0.183 0.169 -0.218 -0.305
(1.65)* (2.04)** (0.67) (0.58) (1.39) (2.35)**
language 0.298 0.369 -0.225 -0.266 0.522 0.551
(2.53)** (2.81)*** (1.45) (1.48) (4.86)*** (5.75)***
Log(distance) -0.337 -0.186 -0.434 -0.341 -0.081 0.039
(3.28)*** (2.37)** (3.58)*** (3.85)*** (0.99) (0.57)
Schengen 0.061 0.264 -0.628 -0.656 0.351 0.166
(0.23) (0.87) (1.42) (1.30) (1.69)* (0.73)
Immigr. policy -0.053 0.090 0.021
(0.30) (0.39) (2.83)***
Popul. at dest 0.284 0.271 0.316
(5.39)*** (3.87)*** (6.25)***
Social exp 0.005 0.019 -0.022
(0.52) (1.82)* (0.15)
Wages at dest -0.023 -0.035 0.031
(1.98)** (2.48)** (2.77)***
Constant 3.461 -2.251 3.219 -2.461 1.953 -6.049
(3.06)*** (1.64) (2.08)** (1.47) (2.35)** (4.99)***
Dest dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Orig dum yes No Yes No Yes No
Pseudo R2 0.955 0.945 0.963 0.960 0.848 0.875
Observations 5374 4649 4653 3974 5498 4762
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
379 Appendix B : Data sources
9.1 Migration data
￿ Mij(h) : diaspora size by skill level h, de￿ned as the number of people with skill
level h (h = 1;2;3) aged 25+ born in country i and living in (OECD) country
j:Source : Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009).
￿ Nij(h) : migration ￿ ows, skill level h; proxied by the change in ln(Mij(h))
between 1990 and 2000.
9.2 Variables related to migration costs dij
￿ Geodesic distance in kms (distij). Source : Clair, Gaullier, Mayer and Zignago
(2004).
￿ Colonial Links : Dummy variable capturing whether there is a colonial link
after 1945 between i and country j: Source : Clair, Gaullier, Mayer and Zignago
(2004).
￿ Linguistic proximity : Dummy variable capturing a common language between
i and country j: Source : Clair, Gaullier, Mayer and Zignago (2004).
￿ Schengen agreement : dummy variable taking 1 if both countries are subject
to the the Schengen agreement between European countries. Source: European
Commission.
￿ Skill price wj : Estimates obtained from a log wage equation based on the US
New Immigrant Survey (estimated across 3,994 workers aged 22+ when they
last worked in their home country and who reported a wage at their last job).
The speci￿cation included the worker￿ s age and its square and the log of the
year when the wage was reported, gender, and schooling in years. The predicted
skill price by country in the data set is the hourly wage for a male worker with
12 years of schooling at age 40 for the year 2000. Source : Rosenzweig (2008)
￿ Social expenditure as a share of GDP, A1
j. Source OECD
￿ Degree of selective immigration policy, A2
j: captured by the share of refugees
in the total number of migrants, year 1980 or 1990. Source : United Nations
Population Division.
￿ Population size in country j. Source : United Nations Population Division.
389.3 Diplomatic representation (for Heckman estimation)
￿ Diplomatic representation : dummy variable capturing type of diplomatic rep-
resentation of country j in country i prevailing in 1990. This variable can take 4
di⁄erent values capturing the strength of the diplomatic representation. Source:
Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchanges, version 2006.1.
9.4 Instruments of Diasporas (IV estimation)
￿ Guest Worker agreement: dummy variable taking 1 if there was a bilateral
guest worker agreement in the 50￿ s and 60￿ s between country i and country j
facilitating the migration of workers from country i. Own computations.
￿ Proxies for potential diaspora Mij prevailing in 1960:
ln(pop60i ￿ immstj=distij) ￿ Confi
where pop60i is the population size in 1960 (source: United Nations Population
Division), immstj is the stock of migrants in country j in 1960 (source: United
Nations Population Division) and Confi is a variable capturing the number of
con￿ icts in country i between 1946 and 1960. Confi can be measured in three
ways. First, Confi = conf1i where conf1i is the number of armed con￿ ict with
death numbers comprised between 25 and 999. Second, Confi = conf2i where
conf2i is the number of armed con￿ ict with death numbers over 999. Third,
Confi = conf1i + conf2i: Source : We use the PRIO armed con￿ icts database
(version 4-2008), a con￿ ict-year data set with information on armed con￿ icts
where at least one party is the government of a state in the time period 1946-
2007. A description of this data set can be found in Gleditsch et al. (2002).
Changes introduced in the updated version 4-2008 are described in Harbom et
al. (2007).
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